Vie Steele v. Robert H. Breinholt : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1986
Vie Steele v. Robert H. Breinholt : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ford G. Scalley; Morgan, Scalley & Reading; Attorney for Respondent
James R. Hasneyager; Marquardt, Hasenyager & Custen; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Steele v. Breinholt, No. 860321 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/227
y 1 Afs ' J U U H i u r Mr rsHus 
BRIEF 
I''"'AH 
K F U 
50 
•A10 
DOCKET NO. % 6 Q " 3 ^ ) - C ^ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIE STEELE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT H. BREINHOLT dba 
ASPEN CARE CENTER, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 860347 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Ford G. Scalley, 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Respondent 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
< ... y H 
i • • ' 
rs
 n « • -. 
— .-. ., 
~ '
 f< - >l T 'V;7",'£ 
~oi.»»f. uteh 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIE STEELE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT H. BREINHOLT dba : 
ASPEN CARE CENTER, : 
Respondent. 
: Case No. 860347 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, DISTRICT JUDGE 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — r — — — — — — — — — ^ — 
Ford G. Scalley, 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney fpr Respondent 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake 4icy» Utah 84111 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 1 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS , 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT , 
ARGUMENT , 
I. OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. . . , 
II. SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE, 
CONCLUSION , 
2 
5 
6 
8 
11 
13 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977) 7 
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, P.2d 176 (1961) . . . 2 
Dixon v. Stoddard, 627 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1981) . 7 
Hobbs v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 677 P.2d 
1128 (Utah 1984) 2 
Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981). . . . . . . 2 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981). . . . . . 2 
Powers v. Gene's Bids. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 
""" 176 (Utah 1977) . 7 
State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977) . . . . . 7 
State v. Hoyt , .31)4 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1981) . . . . . . . .12 
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) 7 
State v. Ocean, 24 Or.App. 289, 546 P.2d 150 
(Or.Ct.App. 1976) 8,9 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985). . 7 
State v. Taylor, 17 Or.App. 499, 522 P.2d 499 
(Or.Ct.App. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . c-
Waters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981) 7 
STATUTES 
Or. Rev. Stat. §164.205(4) (1953) 8 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(4) (1978) 1,2,6,7 
8,11,13 
20 C.F.R. 405.1121(k)(1977) 10 
STATEMENT -.r int. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
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r
 ' ''> '/ « .• : -r? n: refusing to instruct I he |ury 
^> -tatutorv d e f e n s e I i tjs| r*-w. Mini n m 1 i ifi "Ii jh Code 
S T A T E M E N T 0 1 ; rii :ASE 
"?'. 1 i - t ! ^ ^ n p n r-aro Center 
instigated -i citizen ^ arrest i apoel int v>*-ita ^ t e e i ^ >*r was 
demanding *. v i c i • - » • . , ; — .
 L e s i a ' r -* i Ii ad 
•- 4 , - -.: c •„ , .. i w r i t i .
 t , " • :- : f e p 1: 1 er• f - iv /ate 
att o r n e y , t^ retrain rtom visiting *:fi *n ; i ^ . disturbances 
V" h> - ; t.; ^p oatien*" bad 
j"'! *rmed two Aspen l>are employees tha' e * ' ^* ^r:* -'-*- v : s . 
Steele and after she " * J: been ' >i'je* * • / 
A- •-: .i - eps an* . ,v *;* ewoman -j appellant w a^ 
taken % t; 1icewoman ?< ! n e Ogden « .r v po i
 ;oe S*- ^  uoo^ed 
and r e l e a s e d u ueL uwu reeo^r 3 i 
t.-,)«j^'nr: * marges °" November 28, 1984 - elderly patienr lied 
on October r , ivhn, .in - November 28, 1984, chaLges : • s. 
Steele w< '~ ^n representations of 
the City Prosecute f .^j • i <-,» i*y nac aeclde'l ^ dismiss the charges 
after conferring w r "• v~u^r • *- 'PH. --' emplo: 
le.- ;^*p-M. "are rt:.ie; • J * • I «,• i n^iieve 
there ,v ^  i purpose *: i ha' ,.« m t , r lollou ~u> rhrt;^:- ,ILU m e 
trie? Thereafter * . i c-spondent 
Ro.r,• : " nr^i :i.n ~ ^ e ; -d-e Center seeking actual n d punitive 
damages for idliLitUb ^losetuiiua, abuse of pr — i -u i nipr i son-
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ment and the tort of outrage. 
Appellant Vietta Steele appeals from an adverse judgment 
in the trial court, claiming that it was prejudicial error for the 
trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the statutory defense 
to the charge of criminal trespass, contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-206(4)(1978). Appellant seeks a new trial on the basis of 
that error. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's Statement of Facts ignores the cardinal 
rule of appellate review that the record will be reviewed in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial court. 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); Hutcheson v. 
Gleave, 632 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah 1981); Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 
2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961). Indeed the Statement of Facts set 
forth in appellant's brief only recites that evidence which 
allegedly supports her claim of error and ignores material evidence 
which supports the trial court's decision. This has been held to be 
an independent basis for affirmance. Hobbs v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1984). The following statement of 
facts simply directs the court's attention to those facts which 
clearly support the trial court's finding in favor of respondent. 
This case arises from the events surrounding appellant 
Vietta Steele's ("Steele") long-time friendship with a man named 
Zenon Dompor ("Dompor"). Dompor was an elderly patient at the Aspen 
Care Center ("Care Center"), a privately owned and operated skilled 
nursing home facility in Ogden, Utah. (R.912-913) Mr. Dompor had 
- 3 -
no family e x c e p t a sister living, In rhe Pli i 1 i | • 1m 1 ^ and I niec e in 
< R , *•> I 1, '• ! - " 'le suf f e r e d a s t r o k e in June <«f I'-» 'M, 
... ,rl 5) 
u r,r> 1 <• *,-: i c »r * i el d 
l he; r r t v * -3 s *• e J L h - 1 r e l a t i v e , 
^•r^s * H g u a r d i a n of '>omp • * 
ad L d t c < - b e h a l f c o n c e r n i n g h i s nrtiu ^ it: *>lt: . a ! +y u i 
.-a* *- -ro\;i '^1 Lu ijim. r - J' - -% v °.ad 
t m^nv p e r s o n ^ , t.eai.:»~. * *r ,*r u , n-i - , s t a t r .a" : e d e r a * 
a g e n c i e s o v e r s e e i n g skilled **u-» -; 1 np * a; t;:;v 
Newt> c^nre1 - , ladequat- *, * •-. i.ko o 
M^ T • ^hpen "die ^ er.^i, ~-uL bj jL!:itc skilled 
ca.*t centers ^' r-ic, U i , o) ' ) 
] ^pnon Dnnpo; became upset wer M:- Steele's 
i n v o l v e m e n t .- affairs »v ^ "< j - •' J :awve- l^t. *• . id 
H a v a s wnu btt < -^  ^ J, *W I . 
t e r m i n a t e anv power >; jLf."nrv sl,e ::^v nait
 5 i , t o g e t h e r .v,:th a 
termination i power .iH-r- - °ur j ^ -22, 
885 - -j« ; av- " juwe* oi dUor^ey 
affairs, and told Havas that *^ e lidr'* .ant -r^el- ^ v e anyth-
to do with h 1 in or interfere • pr *-hat-
tinu. , Steele iinnt inued to vis.-- Dompor a I. the Care Center" with the 
same frequency as beforef b~*. ~.*c ,LicJ Lo avoid (he Carp CenfiM' 
staff. (R.*- v 
M
' Havas again sen* ^ let* ^ •  'ated June Ll, x^o4, to Mrs. 
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Steelefs attorney reflecting Mrs. Steele had been at Aspen Care 
Center causing disturbances involving Zenon Dompor and requesting 
her to stay away and refrain from causing further disturbances or he 
would be forced to obtain a restraining order. (R.624, 892) 
Steele had recently visited Dompor at the Care Center and caused a 
disturbance which upset Dompor. (R.893) The Care Center believed 
it was "detrimental to [Domporfs] well being11 for Steele to continue 
visiting, and therefore requested Havas to send the letter. (R.893) 
An officer at the state Ombudsmen's office also requested that Havas 
write the letter. (R.893) Dompor told members of the Care Center 
staff in June of 1984 that he did not want Steele to visit him. 
(R.776) 
Just past noon on October 22, 1984, the appellant Vietta 
Steele marched into the Aspen Care Center with a tape recorder in 
hand and walked over to visit with Mr. Dompor. (R.632) Two Aspen 
Care Center employees (Jolene Anderson, a Social Work Designee and 
Debbie Hill, a Medical Records Clerk) separately asked Mr. Dompor if 
he wanted to be visited by Mrs. Steele and he replied no. (R.780, 
805) In addition, Dompor had come to Hill earlier that morning, 
before Steele's arrival and crying, told Hill that Steele had 
visited him the night before and that he did not want to visit her 
any more. (R.775) Dompor told Hill that he was afraid Steele was 
"after his money." (R.775) 
Jolene Andersen and Debbie Hill each asked Mrs. Steele 
several times to leave but each time she refused. (R.786, 804, 823) 
They called a policewoman who also asked her to leave and she 
r e f u s e d . IR .8 17) Mrs. S t e e l e eve? - , _ - * •
 r» . . > , i 
M 'I'I i is "idv i s - ' * r - i i . ^ . : , i -. 1 i * no t 
l e a v e she wouxd he - r r res te - i i.. t r e s p a s s i n g (•• • ; ^ j t r - *-:>: * . , 
( k . t f l 7 ) She r e f u s e „ i i * 3 / ~ * s 
a r r e s t f^r"1, ' • ! :'»tr • . I : t e r * u>- ner •.*> ' > . w^e -
booke * 2*ic * e l e a s e d r e c o g n i z a n c e . ; * ^ e i e 
••^  • . - at nn V»\J of t -ei •-'• Jieiiut . S t e e l e 
•*.. -i .'t i K'er - j ru t 'eMi ' na t > i n ^ e -;bt* v« -. being, ^r1 '*--^ • * LOe 
" ' ^ '
i r r i b l ^ * -v i g s v LtidL we:-- -i .-.--: , , .< . - - Center 
i • t»m I 11 ri< i" w ! in i" "i 1 oc umen t ed , ( R , 838 - 8 3 9) Wh i 1 e s * i I • t * * n e Care 
C e n t e r , S t e e l e had a t one p o i n t t o l d Anderson t h a t she 
a r r e s t e d s Mi.il I 11•• e v n l ,': t l:lul <I,i/ wool d be d o c u m e n t e d , 
( R . B 2 3 ) 
On ut morning ot Noveir-^ '* ld8 -
schedule rraignment, she wis nw? ii:ied that r
 r ~espass charge 
would not •< > : jsecuted because Dompor had died i" r UL n v t 
after Ltie < • - ' ,; ',,», ' N eele rh*Mi IM'DL. : ^ ^t-io« against 
tnc. Care Center .*nj ,,- - .wrier Robert Breinhol* . alleging malicious 
prosec it i on
 : abuse oi process, the i«.-: .;*•', and (alse 
i in pi: i . ..\u,r» 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The. trial court properly rod uned f lu.» requested instruction 
bee a\ jse there was no substant iaJ evidence to support either element 
of the defense. 
I Thf" ev i dvnc v i.h w". r one Luwively f. hat the Care Center 
was "of- ope.-- > the public so far as appellant Steele was concerned. 
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Steele knew she had been prohibited from entering the premises, and 
Dompor had told Care Center employees that he didn't want to see 
Steele. She had been requested by Domporfs attorney not to visit 
him and by representatives of the Care Center to leave and by the 
officer to leave. 
II. The evidence also demonstrates conclusively that 
Steele's presence substantially interfered with the operation of the 
Care Center. Testimony showed that Dompor was emotionally upset 
about Steele's prior visits and that her presence on October 22, 
1984, further upset him emotionally. 
ARGUMENT 
The sole issue raised on this appeal is whether it was 
error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the 
statutory defense to the charge of criminal trespass which is 
contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978). The trial judge 
instructed the jury that if they found that Steele would have been 
guilty of criminal trespass, she could not recover on any of the 
civil causes of action alleged. If the trial court had instructed 
the jury regarding the statutory defense, and the jury had found the 
defense applicable, Steele may have obtained a favorable verdict on 
her civil claims. Steele, therefore, claims that she was prejudiced 
by the trial court's refusal to instruct on the statutory defense 
which reads as follows: 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this 
section: 
(a) That the property was open to the public 
when the actor entered or remained; and 
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially 
interfere with the owner's use of the property. 
-7-
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978). 
It is well established in Utah law that a party is 
entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case if 
there is any substantial evidence to justi 
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 
622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980); See also wJ 
455, 458 (Utah 1981). However, where the 
reasonable basis to support the instruction, a trial court's refusal 
fy such an instruction. 
1977); State v. McCumber, 
tters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 
evidence provides no 
to give the instruction is not reversible 
627 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1981); Powers v. Gen 
error. Dixon v. Stoddard, 
je's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). In additioh, even where the failure 
to instruct may have been error, if it appears that the outcome of 
• j 
the trial would not have been affected by giving the requested 
i 
instruction, failure to instruct is not prejudicial error. State v. 
Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985); Stftte v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 
188 (Utah 1977). 
The question whether this instruction was properly 
refused, therefore, requires an analysis of whether there was any 
substantial evidence to justify an instruction on the defense. The 
defense has two elements. A jury when giv^n an instruction on this 
defense, must find that (1) the premises were open to the public at 
the time of the alleged trespass, and (2) the person's presence did 
not substantially interfere with the owners use of the property. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978) . Unless both of those elements 
are established, the defense is not available to the appellant. The 
-o-
sufficiency of the evidence as to each element of the defense is 
discussed below. 
POINT I. 
OPEN TO THE PUBLIC 
The Utah Supreme Court has not interpreted the phrase 
"open to the public" as contained in §76-6-206(4). Therefore, 
reference must be made to the decisions from other states which have 
interpreted that phrase in the same context. In State v. Ocean, 24 
Or.App. 289, 546 P.2d 150, 152 (Or.Ct.App. 1976), the Oregon Court 
of Appeals interpreted the phrase "open to the public" as it is 
found in Oregon's criminal trespass statute. In that case, the 
defendant had received written notice from Fred Meyer Corporation 
prohibiting him from entering any Fred Meyer store without the 
permission of an officer of the corporation. Despite this pro-
hibition, defendant entered a Fred Meyer store and was charged with 
criminal trespass. The defendant claimed his entry was not unlawful 
because the store was "open to the public" at the time of his entry. 
In deciding the meaning of the phrase "open to the public," the 
Oregon court referred to the statutory definition of that phrase as 
contained in Or.Rev.Stat. §164.205(4)(1953), which definition reads 
as follows: 
"Open to the public" means premises which by their 
physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice 
or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time 
would cause a reasonable person to believe that no 
permission to enter or remain is required." 
Under Oregon law, as under Utah law, a person is not guilty of 
-9-
unlawful entry if the premises are open t<j) the public at the time. 
See State v. Taylor, 17 Or.App. 499, 522 P.2d 499, 500-501 
(Or.Ct.App. 1974). However, the court held that because the 
defendant had been prohibited from entering the premises of any Fred 
Meyer store, he was "not a member of the general public to whom the 
premises were open, even during business qours." State v. Ocean, 
546 P.2d at 152-153. 
Applied to the facts of this casle, the above interpre-
tation of the phrase "open to the public" 
here as in Ocean. Steele had received a 1! 
yields the same result 
etter from Mr. Domporfs 
According to her own 
prohibited from entering 
ot obtain permission to 
attorney requesting she not visit Dompor. 
testimony, Steele understood that she was 
the Care Center premises and that she did 
enter the premises on October 22, 1984. According to the testimony 
of Debra Hill, Jolene Andersen, and Officet Ann Grotegut, Steele was 
asked repeatedly to leave the premises and!each time refused. In 
light of this evidence, it is clear that Steele was not a member of 
the general public to whom the Care Center was open. Further-
more, there is more reason in this case tolhold that the premises 
were not open to the public than there was in Ocean. In that case 
the premises involved were that of a Fred Meyer retail department 
store. A retail store extends a broad invi 
public to enter its premises, to look, and 
nursing home such as the Care Center, maked 
this basis alone, the court may find that qhe Care Center was not 
i 
open to the public when Steele entered its (premises on October 22, 
tation to the general 
to buy its products. A 
no such invitation. On 
-10-
1984. 
However, there is an additional basis such a finding to 
support such a finding. Domporfs election on the basis of his right 
as a patient at the Care Center supports the determination that the 
Care Center was not open to the public so far as Steele was 
concerned. Dr. Breinholt, the owner of the Care Center, testified 
that as a condition of the patients1 participation in the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs, the Care Center is required to establish 
certain patients' rights. See 20 C.F.R. §405.1121 (K)(1977). A 
copy of the rights adopted by the Aspen Care Center is marked as 
Exhibit "ll-D" at trial and is a part of this record on appeal. A 
much larger copy of that list of rights was posted in the lobby of 
posted in the lobby of the Care Center in October of 1984. One of 
those rights reads as follows: 
"The patient has the right to associate and 
communicate with persons of his choice " 
(See Exhibit "ll-D"). The evidence shows that Mr. Domporfs attorney 
advised Mrs. Steele by letter not to visit him at the Care Center. 
In addition, Mr. Dompor told Care Center employees Debra Hill and 
Jolene Anderson on more than one occassion that he did not want Mrs. 
Steele to visit him. By prohibiting Steele from entering the 
premises, the Care Center simply enforced Dompor!s right. 
This evidence clearly shows that the Care Center was not 
"open to the public11 on October 22, 1984, so far as the appellant 
Vietta Steele was concerned, and that there was no substantial 
evidence to support the instruction. Since both requirements of 
-11-
§76-6-206(4) must be met to establish the statutory defense the 
defense must fail, and this court should $ffirm the trial court's 
ruling that the instruction was not warranted. However, even if the 
court should find that the Care Center was open to the public to 
Mrs. Steele on October 22, 1984, the statutory defense is still not 
available to Steele because her conduct substantially interfered 
with the owner's use of the premises. 
POINT II 
SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE 
The statutory defense contained jin Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-206(4)(1978) requires as its second element a showing that 
"the actor's conduct did not substantially! interfere with the owners 
use of the property". As with the first element of this defense, 
there is no Utah Case law which explains wqat substantial 
interference means in the context of this Statute. In addition, a 
search of the case law in other states reveals no definition of 
substantial interference in the context of 
question whether Steele's presence at the (tare Center substantially 
interfered with the operation of the Care Center must, therefore, be 
decided on the basis of logic and sound rea* 
practical realities of nursing home adminisi 
To substantially interfere with the operation of a nursing 
home facility, the person's conduct must constitute such a burden 
upon the operation of the facility that the! 
on the operation in a reasonably safe and proper manner. To operate 
a nursing home facility in a reasonably safp and proper manner, in 
a criminal trespass. The 
soning, in light of the 
tration. 
owner is unable to carry 
-12-
this context, means to be able to assure the patients' reasonable 
protection from disturbing and upsetting influences. To achieve 
that protection, the administrator of a nursing home facility must 
be able to control the environment within the facility. That 
includes the right to prohibit certain persons from visiting that 
facility who are likely to disturb or upset a patient. The patient 
himself, may certainly request that such persons be prohibited from 
entering the premises if that patient does not want to visit those 
people. See State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 888-889 (Minn. 1981) 
(resident has the right to determine who he may associate with). In 
addition, the administrator of the facility has the discretion to 
prohibit such visits if in its judgment those visits would adversely 
affect the physical or emotional health of the patient. This 
is the proper standard to determine whether Steele's conduct 
constituted substantial interference in this case. This court 
should adopt that standard in deciding whether the second element of 
the statutory defense is met. 
As measured by that standard, Steele's conduct on October 
22, 1984 substantially interfered with the operation of the Care 
Center, and the second element of the statutory defense is, 
therefore, not met. The evidence shows that Dompor, his attorney 
and the Care Center had requested that Steele not return to visit 
Dompor. According to the testimony of Care Center employees, Dompor 
was emotionally upset by Steele's visits. Shortly before Steele's 
arrest, Dompor approached Care Center employee Debra Hill about 
Steele's visits. Dompor was crying and emotionally upset. He told 
-13-
addition, when Steele 
er arrest, Dompor once 
Hill that Steele had visited him the night before and that he did 
not want her to visit him again. Dompor tjiad expressed the same 
concern some four months earlier and the Care Center sent the June 
I 
21st letter to Steele prohibiting her froni visiting Dompor. Mr. 
I 
Havas testified that when he visited Dompdr, Dompor became visibly 
upset at the mention of Steele's name. Inj 
arrived at the Care Center on the day of h|< 
again told both Hill and Andersen that he l^id not want to see 
Steele. Andersen and Hill testified that in their judgment Steele's 
presence and the commotion she caused would adversely affect Mr. 
Domporfs emotional condition. 
On that evidence, it is clear that Dompor did not want Steele 
to visit him. It is also clear that in the Care Center's judgment, 
Steele's visits were likely to further upset Dompor emotionally. 
Steele's visits, therefore, constituted a Substantial interference 
visits rendered the Care 
rom emotionally upsetting 
, all reasonable men must 
instruction on 
with the operation of the Care Center. Her 
Center employees unable to protect Dompor fl 
or disturbing influences. On this evidence 
I 
conclude that there was no basis for a juryj 
§76-6-206(4)(b). This court, therefore, shpuld conclude that the 
requested instruction was properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied the jury instruction on 
the statutory defense to criminal trespass $et forth in Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978). There was no substantial evidence upon 
which to base either element of that defens^. The evidence clearly 
-14-
established that the Care Center was not open to the public as that 
phrase is used in the statute. In addition, the evidence establish-
es conclusively that Steele's presence substantially interfered with 
the operation of the Care Center. Since there is no evidenciary 
basis to support the requested instruction, the trial court properly 
denied the same. 
DATED this p^jjf Aay of October, 1986. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
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20 C . S . R . § 4 0 5 . 1 1 2 1 (k) (1|977) 
188 April, 1977 
MEDICARE/MEDICAID OPERATING STANDARDS 
Skilled Nursing Facilities 
405.1121 GOVERNING BODY AND MANAGEMENT, contd. 
Interpretive Guideline*! [Issued by HEWs Office of Long Term tyre. June, 1975) 
1. Policies and procedures recognize the needs of patients to have access to and maintain con-
tact with the community of which they are a part and members of that community have 
access to him. 
2. Subject to reasonable scheduling restrictions, visiting policies and procedures permit patients 
to receive visits from anyone they wish. A particular visitor may be restricted by the facility 
for one of the following reasons: 
a. The patient refuses to see the visitor. 
b. The patient's physician documents specific reasons why such a visit would be harmful to 
the patient's health. 
c. The visitor's behavior is unreasonably disruptive of the functioning of the facility (this 
judgment must be made by the administrator and the reasons are documented), this is 
not intended to preclude those who, because they advocate administrative changes to pro-
tect patient rights, are considered a disruptive influence by the administrator. 
3. Decisions to restrict a visitor are reviewed and reevaluated each time the patient's plan of care 
and medical orders are reviewed by the physician and nursing staff or at the patient's request. 
4. Space is provided for patients to receive visitors in reasonable comfort and privacy. 
5. Telephones, consistent with ANSI standards (405.1134(c)), are available and accessible for 
patients to make and receive calls with privacy. Patients who need help are assisted in using 
the phone. The fact that telephone communication is possible, as well as any restrictions, is 
made known to patients. 
6. Arrangements are made to provide assistance to patients who require help in reading or send-
ing mail. 
(k)(12) May meet with, and participate in activities of, social, religious, and 
community groups at his discretion, unless medically contraindicated (as documented 
by his physician in his medical record); ! 
Interpretive GoMttinatt [Issued by HEWs Office of Long Term Care, June, 1975] 
1. Patients who wish to meet with or participate in activities of social, religious, or other com-
munity groups in or outside of the facility are informed and encouraged and assisted to do so. 
(405.1131(b)). 
2. All patients have the freedom to refuse to participate in these activities. 
(k)(13) May retain and use his personal clothing and possessions as space permits, 
unless to do so w o 0 infringe upon rights of other patients, and unless medically 
contraindicated (as documented by his physician in his medical record); and 
Interpretive Gakfettneet {Issued by HEWs Office of Long Term Carei June, 1975] 
1. Patients are permitted to keep reasonable amounts of personal clothing and possessions for 
their use while in the facility and such personal property is kept in a safe location which is 
convenient to the patient. 
2. Patients are advised, prior to or at admission, of the kinds and amounts of clothing and 
possessions permitted for personal use, and whether the facility will accept responsibility for 
maintaining these items (e.g., cleaning and laundry). 
3. Am/pewoiiaJ ctothiM or poaaesrions retained by tn^ 
identified and recorded on admission and a receipt given to the patient. The facility if 
reaponaible for secure storage of such Hems, and they are returned to the patient promptly 
upon request or upon discharge from the facility. 
(k)(14) If married, is assured privacy for visits by his/her spouse; if both are 
inpatients in the facility, they are permitted to share a room, unless medically 
contraindicated (as documented by the attending physician in the medical record). 
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